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Abstract. We present the internationalization of the family firm (FF) as a corporate 
growth strategy that is sometimes necessary to ensure survival. The different generations 
running the family firm (GFF) are likely to be constrained, not only by the demands of 
the business itself, but also by activism from non-management family shareholders. In 
this paper, we perform an analysis of a sample of Spanish family firms, both domestic 
and multinational, for the period 2000–2009. The results of this analysis show evidence 
of a positive relationship between the scope of internationalization and two other vari-
ables: family activism (FAI) and life cycle duration of the family firm (DLFF). When it 
comes to seeking alternative ways to create economic value and obtain debt finance, each 
generation is less risk averse than the preceding one. However, increasing family conflict 
over successive generations instigates economic value-destroying behavior. Overall, our 
findings suggest that economic value creation, leverage and international diversification 
in FFs will be conditioned not only by the ownership structure and size of the company, 
but also by the firm’s current point in the business life cycle, the generation that is in 
charge, and activism from other family members, all of which play a decisive role in the 
FF internationalization and economic value creation process.
Keywords: shareholder activism, internationalization, family firm, economic value crea-
tion, leverage.
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1. Introduction
Traditional theory views firm internationalization as a multiphase process starting rela-
tively late in the business life cycle. According to some studies, internationalization is 
less likely to developing the early stages of the business life cycle (Eriksson et al. 1997; 
Johanson, Vahlne 1977). However, other studies suggest that early entry into foreign 
markets is generally seen as an opportunity for firm growth, particularly in dynamic, 
high-tech industries (Zahra et al. 2000).
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Between these two perspectives, which are not completely contradictory, we propose 
another. Certain characteristics of family firms (FFs), such as their ownership structure, 
their long-term objectives, their prioritization of survival over the exploitation of growth 
options, their tendency to minimize risk of going on foreign market adventures, etc., 
might differentiate them in behavioral terms from non-family firms, in issues related to 
internationalization (the scope or scale of international diversification), economic value 
creation and debt policy.
Specific characteristics related to ownership structure, shareholder activism, and genera-
tion running the firm (GFF), may have a decisive influence in the international diversifi-
cation process of family firms. Ownership structure plays a major role both in the firm’s 
strategic orientation and its ability to adapt to environmental change and uncertainty 
(Peng et al. 2004). 
With regard to the influence of the generation running the company, it should be noted 
that the impact of this factor will depend on the stage the FF has reached in its lifecycle. 
Capabilities and resources for internationalization will be greater in later stages of the 
business lifecycle. The GFF will also assess the firm’s attainable growth options against 
its chances of survival (Carr et al. 2010).
Another of the important factors this paper aims to analyze is the FF’s economic value-
creating capability. Commenting on this point, Berle and Means (1932) note that owner-
ship concentration reduces owner-manager conflict of interests and improves economic 
value-creation. Demsetz (1983) argues, in contrast, that ownership concentration is an 
endogenous variable deriving from the outcome of profit-maximizing decisions taken 
by current and future shareholders and has no impact on firm value. 
In the FF environment, potential activism by certain members of the GFF not directly 
involved in managerial decisions can have a major impact on the firm’s capacity for 
economic value creation and its debt policy. In this case, the major family shareholders 
will have greater incentives to control firm management than to expropriate wealth from 
minor shareholders. Within this same context, a high debt level in a FF is seen as a 
threat to the firm’s survival and will therefore be closely monitored by non-management 
family shareholders.
These arguments prompted us to investigate whether there are any distinguishing fea-
tures between family and non-family firms that might influence the internationalization 
and economic value creation process. In particular, what problems confront the family 
firm with respect to its growth and international diversification policy? Is there any 
reason to suppose that shareholder activism influences the debt, liquidity/leverage and 
internationalization policy of the FF? What impact does the generation running the com-
pany1 (1GFF, 2GFF, 3GFF, etc.) have on decision-making in the family firm? Which 
drivers of economic value creation do family firms apply?
1 For this research, a 1GFF is defined as a family-owned and managed firm, with more than one fam-
ily member involved, but only of the first and founding generation of the family. 2GFF and 3GFF 
are defined as firms in which the second or third generations of the family are also involved in the 
ownership and management of the company (Lussier, Sonfield 2010; Leach, Bogod 1999).
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Our study therefore contributes in various ways to clarifying issues regarding the role 
of family firms. The first contribution is towards identifying drivers of the FF interna-
tionalization process, which we find to be ownership activism, the generation running 
the firm, and DLFF. Secondly, to highlight the importance of two factors: the firm’s 
capacity to innovate and the issue of which generation is in charge in influencing a 
firm’s decision-making in relation to economic leverage and value creation. Finally, 
we present a model to illustrate the influence of activism by non-management family 
shareholders in these two areas.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
latest ideas on ownership structure, debt, economic value creation and internationaliza-
tion, and a set of derived hypotheses. Section 3 shows a description of the database and 
methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 explains the results and examines their 
robustness. Section 5 discusses the findings and section 6 indicates the limitations and 
suggests some directions for future research.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
Despite the significant contribution to national economies made by family firms in terms 
of economic value added and employment, few countries have made precise evaluations 
of this impact. Another important issue to be considered is the concentration of family 
firms across sectors. Basically, the highest concentrations are found among small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and in traditional labor-intensive (Villalonga, Amit 2008), 
cyclical sectors (Bobillo et al. 2013). FFs are less likely to be engaged in financial and 
high-tech industries.
Another important question concerns the characteristics of the generation running the 
firm and the differences and similarities of its members. Most of the research points 
to major differences between 1GFF and subsequent generations, although they decline 
with each successive generation. Dyer (1988) notes a paternalistic management culture 
in 1GFFs, while next generations adopt a more professional management approach.
Also worth noting in this respect is the key role played by the founder while he/she re-
tains his/her position in the family firm, since the norms and values established by this 
person in the initial stages will influence the FF’s structure to some extent for generations 
to come2. Furthermore, Moreno et al. (2010) signal the founder’s orientation towards 
success and training for the professional qualifications as factors affecting firm size.
Following Ansari and Bell (1991) our joint technical-rational and collectivist approach 
to the analysis of the FF enables us to consider the possibility that the differences in 
organizational structure (shared values and behavioral norms) between the FF (tradi-
tion, securing independence, retaining long-term control) and the non-FF (maximization 
of firm value for shareholders), may result in different strategic aims with respect to 
economic value creation.
2 Burkart et al. (2003) point out certain peculiarities that arise following the retirement of the founder 
in FFs in various economies. 
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Key factors requiring consideration are the issue of which generation is in charge of 
the firm at any given moment and activism on the part of non-management family 
shareholders. As the family increases in complexity with successive generations, the 
management team will perceive more risk factors and seek information relating to the 
market, to customer needs, or to the firm’s internal relations, in order to reorganize and 
gather the necessary resources to deal with possible market threats and exploit market 
opportunities. The prevailing gap between real and perceived risk creates a barrier to 
economic value creation in the family firm. As product/market knowledge-information 
(economic value creation) starts to outweigh the perceived risk deriving from the com-
plexities of family conflict (economic value destruction) shareholders’ propensity to 
attain higher economic value creation will increase (Fig. 1). The sooner the firm attains 
this objective, the sooner it will reach the stage of firm maturity and the longer it will 
survive in foreign markets.
In the current era of globalization with its emphasis on the trade-off between risk and 
profit, economic value creation in the family firm rests on four foundational pillars, 
namely, the ability of successive generations of management (1) to reconcile business 
and family goals; (2) to keep international diversification3 as a basic strategic objective; 
(3) to ensure the profitability of investments to strengthen the FF’s chances of survival; 
and (4) to confront risk deriving from the capital structure of the firm, mainly through 
greater reliance on debt financing. These constitute the necessary drivers of economic 
value creation in the family firm: ownership concentration, debt capacity, current point 
in the business life cycle, international diversification, size, and potential for investment 
and growth.
The above considerations explain the internationalization of FF, which may be their 
way of responding to competitive pressures affecting the firm and its environment. 
These include the need to seek foreign investment and growth opportunities, respond 
3 The terms “international diversification” and “internationalization” will be used indistinctly through-
out this paper.
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to domestic market saturation and threats from globalization, extend the business life-
cycle by expanding into foreign markets, access external knowledge and technology in 
order to become more competitive, and develop alliances with foreign FF in order to 
achieve the critical mass it takes to maintain a sufficient level of R&D. They may also 
be driven by internal pressures, such as the need to create more job opportunities for 
family members or provide its younger members with opportunities to gain international 
business experience. 
In the context of the internationalization of the family firm, it should be noted that the 
traditional theory recommends gradual development in order to acquire knowledge and 
experience while reducing perceived risk. It also points to the dangers to firm survival 
resulting from premature internationalization (Eriksson et al. 1997; Johanson, Vahlne 
1977). This approach, however, has not proved entirely satisfactory in explaining cases 
such as the internationalization of SMEs (the category to which the majority of fam-
ily firms belong) (Crick, Jones 2000). In conclusion, the incremental or gradual model 
fails to explain satisfactorily why some firms go international and others do not, or why 
some SMEs, FFs among them, interrupt their internationalization process while others 
accelerate theirs. Taking into account the above arguments, we focus our analysis on 
the internationalization of the family firm in relation to variables such as the generation 
running the business, the stage reached in the business cycle of the family firm (DLFF), 
and the potentially different goals of the members of the firm’s ownership structure.
Another variable with the potential to explain family firm internationalization is CEO 
and TMT (Top Management Team) characteristics. Westhead et al. (2001) reported 
that firms with older management teams, greater resources, more information, wider 
contact networks and more accumulated knowledge showed a greater propensity to di-
versify their production internationally, especially in sectors characterized by a greater 
need of specific knowledge and international experience. Foreign expansion of FFs is 
likely to be driven by activism on the part of the various non-management ownership 
groups4. Control over management will increase as shareholder activism intensifies. The 
point will come when management will try to escape it by turning to foreign markets5, 
among other reasons because of differences in the risk factors perceived by insider 
shareholders (owner-managers) and outsider shareholders. Therefore, a higher level of 
family shareholder activism, an accumulated knowledge stock, a sufficient volume of 
resources and greater management experience are key elements in increasing the scale 
4 Although in the Family Activism formula developed in the methodology section we made no distinc-
tion between FF shareholder types, it is necessary to point out the differences between independent 
family firm shareholders (those whose only tie with the family business is their share in the capital, 
who are less risk averse and whose focus is on long-term objective oriented towards the firm’s sur-
vival) and leveraged FF shareholders (those with vital ties to the FF, either as employees or service 
providers, and whose focus is on short-term objectives oriented towards firm growth and character-
ized by risk aversion).
5 Nevertheless shareholders not involved in management may, through their greater propensity towards 
activism, drive the firm towards international diversification, it should be noted that they will have 
greater exposure to agency costs, due to the increased difficulty of controlling operations in foreign 
markets (Fatemi 1984).
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or scope of international diversification (Madsen, Servais 1997). The generation running 
the family firm ages alongside the firm itself and the age of either is a good predictor 
of international diversification.
Furthermore, various studies highlight the relationship between the characteristics of 
a firm’s upper echelon and its organizational strategies and performance. In particular, 
there is evidence to show that TMT job-related diversity is linked to firm internationali-
zation (Lee, Park 2006), while TMT diversity in age, tenure, and education are related 
to organizational innovations (Camelo-Ordaz et al. 2005) and to changes in corporative 
strategy (Wiersema, Bantel 1992).
Overall, we share the view that it is the combination of managerial ideals and family 
values which defines the direction of the internationalization process in FF. Based on 
the above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: The scope of international diversification will be positively related with the Family 
Activism Index and the age of the generation running the firm.
Family firms vary in size and ownership structure, the majority being privately owned. 
A large proportion of the research reports that the most powerful enablers of economic 
value creation for FFs are the development and leverage of intangible assets – so-
cial capital, trust, reputation, and tacit knowledge. By using their capabilities and tacit 
knowledge, the human resources of the family firm will try to exploit market opportuni-
ties (Sirmon, Hitt 2003). In this regard, higher ownership concentration might help to 
minimize agency costs between owners and managers and create a family firm structure 
that will stimulate the capacity to exploit its fixed assets in order to pursue increased 
economic value creation (Gosselin 1997).
Likewise, economic value creation in the FFs may also depend on the stage reached in 
the business cycle. Firms reaching the end of the maturity stage will be less prone to 
implement new technology or exploit their innovation capabilities, and be more rigid 
in the style and effectiveness of their corporate governance. At the same time, as the 
lifecycle progresses, FFs become more conservative and less inclined to take the risks 
involved in business activities that might undermine the economic value creation pro-
cess (Zahra 2005). In this same vein, Moreno and Castillo (2011) report an inverse 
relationship between firm growth and age, which might induce a negative relationship 
between DLFF and economic value creation. 
Stability is a primary objective in FFs, where it is a higher priority than growth, which 
is pursued with a certain degree of caution (Upton et al. 2001). They will therefore try 
as far as possible to avoid risky financial operations that could have disastrous conse-
quences for the family itself. We might also mention that the longer lifecycle of family 
firms, both domestic and multinational, enables them to build up a closer relationship 
with creditors, and thus obtain credit more easily and cheaply.
Thus, in relation with FF innovation capabilities and DLFF, the following hypotheses 
are proposed for testing:
H2: Ownership concentration and innovation capacity relate positively to leverage and 
economic value creation in family firms (both domestic and multinational).
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H3: The length of the firm’s lifecycle will relate negatively to economic value creation 
and positively to leverage in family firms (both domestic and multinational).
Ownership concentration can play an effective role in controlling the agency problems 
arising from discrepancies between risk-bearers and decision-makers (Shleifer, Vishny 
1997). However, the concentration of votes in large-block family shareholders is only a 
partial indicator of the influence of firm ownership structure, since family shareholder 
power increases with the frequency with which their votes leads to into decisive changes 
(Alchian, Demsetz 1972) and with the intensity of family activism displayed by the 
owners. Thus, some institutional investors and family blockholders have gained power 
by increasing their activism (David et al. 2001). Nevertheless, the consolidation of this 
group of shareholders could have major repercussions for the FF, since different share-
holders may pursue different objectives (Thomsen, Pedersen 2000). Thus, family activ-
ism will relate positively to debt financing and economic value creation only in so far as 
the interests of large family blockholders coincide with those of minority shareholders.
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that numerous studies stress the influence of the capabili-
ties and motivations of the firm founders (1GFF) on their successors in terms of culture, 
values and economic value creation in the FF (Sharma, Rao 2000). Major problems can 
occur if the FF succession means selecting new managers from a small, uncompetitive 
set of candidates from the next generation. Adams et al. (2004) note that FF govern-
ance can influence economic value creation capacity in very different ways, depending 
on whether the founders or their descendants are running the business. In this regard, 
Lentz and Laband (1990) point out the importance of the intergenerational transfer of 
fixed assets. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) also underline the importance of the transfer 
of specific capital and capabilities (decisiveness in exploiting growth opportunities and 
innovation) for the successful transfer of the FF to the next generation.
At the same time, the dynamics of FF succession increase the likelihood of conflict 
and disagreement among family members (Björnberg, Nicholson 2007). The intensity 
of the conflict increases with each intergenerational transfer (Beckhard, Dyer 1983). 
The consequence of this is the formation of groups of family shareholders who work to 
increase the pressure of their activism6 on the firm’s managers.
Another point worth noting is that successive generations tend towards more profes-
sional, less paternalistic styles of management and financing (Lane et al. 2006). This 
tends to reduce debt-related risk aversion while promoting economic value creation in 
the firm.
These arguments lead to the hypothesis that:
H4: The degree of family activism strengthens the positive effect of ownership concentra-
tion and the incentives (of shareholders and management) to exploit innovation ca-
pabilities and growth opportunities on leverage and economic value creation in FFs.
6 To assess the intensity of this activism, it is necessary to know some details of the type of ownership 
displayed by the family members: leveraged ownership (involving participation in the goods and/or 
services of the FF) or non-leveraged ownership (a share only in the capital). Other useful information 
relates to the situation of the owner-manager (major or minor shareholder).
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3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
The sample uses individualized data for private firms in various sectors of the Span-
ish economy. These data, which were drawn from the Amadeus database, Actualidad 
Económica, España 25.000 database7 published by the organization Fomento de la Pro-
ducción, and firm Web pages, cover a period running from 2000 to 2009 (7,380 obser-
vations in total). The distribution of the sample in terms of the family/non-family and 
domestic/multinational nature of the firm, Family Activism Index, is given in Table 1. 
The distribution of the sample are uniform in term of sectors of activity, however a 
major concentration of FF in traditional labor-intensive and cyclical industries are ob-
served. As shown, the initial sample is comprised of 338 firms for each of the periods 
considered (3,380 firm-year observations). 
Table 1. Sample distribution
Total N. Firms Family Firms Family Firms
FIRMS Multinational Domestic High FAI Low FAI
N. firms 338 177 161 212 126
N. observations 3380 1770 1610 2120 1260
Note: FAI = Family Activism Index.
Of the 338 family firms, 177 (52.3%) are multinationals, while 161 (47.7%) are domes-
tic. Family activism is high in 212 firms (62.7%) and low in the remaining 126 (37.3%). 
The coefficients of correlation between the variables do not show multicollinearity. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
mean sd min max medium
1 lev 0.60 0.22 0 1.99 0.61
2 roa 0.06 0.08 –0.78 1.61 0.05
3 c5 0.70 0.39 0 1 0.97
4 nLSALES 10.83 2.08 1.77 16.70 11.17
5 inCSALES 0.32 5.09 –0.98 185.93 0.07
6 pintang 0.05 0.09 0 0.86 0.02
7 DLFF 3.47 0.56 1.39 4.76 3.53
8 EP 5.64 222.99 –1605.88 10237.95 0.57
9 IO 16.24 282.90 0.05 8740.83 0.96
10 FAI 0.64 0.32 0 1 0.66
7 España 25000 is a financial database that covers the 25000 largest Spanish firms.
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3.2. Variables
Using this sample and following the procedure outlined in the theory section, we under-
take a three-phase study. We first divide the sample FFs into two subsamples: domestic 
and multinational. We then sort the firms by their degree of family activism (high or 
low). To construct the family activism index, we need to consider not only the propor-
tion of shares held by family shareholders, but also which generation runs and owns 
the business. It is the median of this index that is used to obtain the classification of the 
sample, which is analyzed in the third phase of the study. The family activism index 
(FAI) is calculated from the following expression8:
 
( ) { }10FAI FDI 0.1 GFF 1 ,≥= + − fCI  
(1)
where the first term of the above equation, FDI (Family Dominion Index), varies as a 
function of ownership concentration (C) and takes the following form:
 
{ } ( ) { }10 10
1 0.4FDI 0.5 0.1 ,
0.2 0.9< ≥
 = ⋅ + + − 
 Cf Cf
C I C I
 
(2)
where { }10<fCI  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when family shareholders 
hold less than 10% of the shares and 0 otherwise, and { }10≥CfI is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 when family shareholders hold 10% or more of the shares and 0 
otherwise. This expression represents a linear interpolation, such that FDI has a value 
of 0 when C equals zero, 0.5 when C is 10% and 0.9 when C is 100%. 
The second term of the family activism index (FAI) captures the degree of activism on 
the part of family shareholders in relation to the generation running the business, such 
that GFF has a value of 2 if the family shareholder belongs to the first generation, 1.5 
if to the second and 1 if to the third and subsequents. 
The family activism index, FAI, captures the closer control exercised by family share-
holders. We assume, furthermore, that there will be significant capacity to exercise this 
control when the family shareholder holds 10% or more of the shares. The index will 
therefore have a value between 0 and 1. After removing any observations where all of 
the variables required for the estimation of the leverage and economic value creation 
equations are not present, the median value of the activism index (0.66) is calculated 
for the whole sample and used in phase three of the study to segment the sample firms 
by high and low family activism indices.
Previous studies on family business transitions in different countries (Sonfield, Lussier 
2004; Sonfield et al. 2005) enable us to propose a formula for determining the approxi-
mate length of the family firm lifecycle (DLFF)9.
8 This index was developed from Bobillo et al. (2009).
9 See Bobillo et al. (2013).
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3.3. Methodology
The first of the relationships to be examined relates to the scope of internationalization, 
which we explain by regressing the number of countries to which the firm exports (Is) 
on to the family activism index (FAI) and life cycle duration (DLFF) in a simple linear 
regression.
Since we also aim to check for possible simultaneity between debt financing (LEV) and 
economic value creation (ROA), it seems appropriate to use a system of simultaneous 
equations, with one equation for each variable of interest. Thus, the first equation incor-
porates the determinants of debt financing and the second the determinants of economic 
value creation.
Following standard practice in the research on debt financing decisions, we consider 
capital structure to be a function of firm size; firm profitability; the degree of owner-
ship concentration; the structure of collateral assets in the event of loan default or for 
the solution of potential asset substitution problems; the point reached in the business 
lifecycle; and the sector of activity. The determinants considered with regard to eco-
nomic value creation are leverage, size, ownership concentration, growth opportunities, 
economic potential, current point in the business lifecycle, investment opportunities, and 
the firm’s sector of activity.
Thus, the equations take the following form:
 Is = a+ β1.FAI+ β2.DLFF+ eit, (3)
LEVit = a + β1.ROAit + β2.C5it + β3.NLSALESit + β4.INCSALESit + 
β5.PINTANGit + β6.DLFFit + ∑ gjINDUSTRYj+ ei,                                   (4)
ROAit = a + β1.LEVit + β2.C5it + β3.NLSALESit + β4.INCSALESit +  
Β5.EPit + β6.DLFFit + Β7.IOit+ ∑ gjINDUSTRYj + eit.                              (5)
Our first test involves the relationship between the scope of internationalization in FFs 
and its two explanatory variables FAI and DLFF. Our second, given the possible differ-
ences in family firms, i.e., multinational versus domestic, and high versus low family 
activism, our aim is to analyze whether the relationship between leverage and economic 
value creation and the explanatory variables is different in each subsample. We therefore 
estimate the system of equations in a different way in each case.
Estimations in this second phase of the analysis are performed using the three-step 
least squares method (MC3E), which provides greater efficiency than more traditional 
methods, such as two-step least squares estimation, when there are correlations between 
the error terms of the various equations. Leverage and economic value creation are used 
as the endogenous variables.
4. Results
Table 3 shows the data obtained from the regression of the number of countries to 
which a firm is exporting against the degree of family activism and life cycle duration 
in FFs. The relationship in both cases is positive and significant. This confirms our first 
A. M. Bobillo et al. Shareholder activism and internationalization in the family firm
877
hypothesis, H1, that the scope of internationalization in FFs is determined both by the 
degree of family activism and by the stage the firm has reached in its lifecycle. The F 
statistic indicates joint statistical significance.
Table 4 shows the results of the simultaneous equation regressions of leverage and eco-
nomic value creation on the two subsets of explanatory variables for the multinational 
and domestic FF subsamples.
As far as the individual hypotheses are concerned, there is a positive linear relationship 
between LEV and C5 for both multinational and domestics FF and between LEV and 
PINTANG which partially confirms our second hypothesis, H2. DLFF has a significant 
negative influence on economic value creation in both multinational FFs and domestic 
FFs, which partially confirms our third hypothesis, H3, since, contrary to expectations, 
it has a negative influence on leverage in domestic FFs. Other relationships worth noting 
are the negative influence of leverage on economic value creation, the positive influence 
of size on debt financing in both multinational and domestic FFs, and the negative influ-
ence of investment opportunities in domestic FFs. The simultaneous equation estimates 
proved to be highly significant for economic value creation equation in both subsamples 
and for leverage in the multinational subsample.
Table 5 presents the simultaneous equation estimates for the high/low family activism 
subsamples. The simultaneity of the estimation enables us to observe that, while eco-
nomic value creation has a positive influence on the degree of leverage the influence of 
leverage on economic value creation is negative. Both these relationships are significant 
only for the high FAI subsample. Innovation capability proves to be significant and posi-
tive in the leverage equation, but, as predicted by hypothesis 4, only in association with 
high family activism. This is precisely the kind of firm in which growth opportunities, 
which is positively signed, and length of lifecycle and investment opportunities, both 
negatively signed, provide the basis of the capacity for economic value creation.






F (2.7377) 240.41 (0.000)***
Notes: Coefficients estimated and P > |z| (between parentheses): ***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10%. For variables definition see Annex I. 
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Table 4. Results from the simultaneous equations model. Multinational FFs vs. domestic FFs
Multinational FFs Domestic FFs























































Notes: Coefficients estimated and P > |z| (between parentheses): ***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10%. For variables definition see Annex I. 
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Table 5. Results from the simultaneous equations model. FFs with high vs. low Family 
Activism Indices
























































Notes: Coefficients estimated and P > |z| (between parentheses): ***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10%. For variables definition see Annex I. 
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5. Discussions and conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the effect of ownership structure and family activism 
(FAI) on leverage, economic value creation and international diversification in the fam-
ily firm. To enrich the analysis, we included additional explanatory variables, such as 
the capacity to exploit intangible assets and the capacity to generate and exploit growth 
opportunities, among others. Together with ownership concentration, we also analyzed 
DLFF (the lifecycle duration) and the FAI as basic determinants of economic value 
creation and international diversification in FFs.
Our review of previous research suggested that, as well as ownership structure, other 
variables associated with the exploitation of intangible assets (capacity to innovate, 
capacity to detect growth opportunities), DLFF, and family activism may provide the 
foundational pillars for economic value creation, survival, and international diversifica-
tion in FFs.
The results of our study largely confirm the hypotheses that we have tested. Firstly, we 
find that there is a linear relationship in family firms between the scope of internation-
alization and the variables for family activism and DLFF. This appears to indicate that a 
certain degree of family activism (which increases the level of information asymmetry) 
drives managers towards expansion into foreign markets in an attempt to escape from 
over-controlling family shareholders and to diversify risk. The successive generations 
running the FF may be less risk averse when it comes to seeking new opportunities 
to create economic value and raise capital. The DLFF (especially at the firm maturity 
stage) is another significant variable that could be capturing the importance of previous 
generations’ accumulated knowledge of foreign markets and greater ability to assess the 
potential risk factors involved.
Secondly, by splitting the FF sample into multinationals and non-multinationals, in the 
search for differences, we find that ownership structure and the exploitation of intangi-
ble assets (the main competitive advantage of FFs) have a positive effect on leverage 
and economic value creation in both these subsamples. However, the DLFF presents 
a negative impact on economic value creation. A possible explanation for this could 
be that the generation running the business initially pursues not short-term growth in 
foreign markets but rather firm survival. This objective is more compatible with the 
tendency of FFs to sacrifice short-term growth in favor of long-term objectives. The 
positive effect on leverage can be explained by the fact that the successive generations 
running the FF are increasingly reluctant to resort to debt in order to finance interna-
tional expansion, and sometimes prefer to finance it through share issues, provided they 
see no danger of losing firm control.
Thirdly, we find evidence of the important role played by family activism in strengthen-
ing the effects of ownership structure, incentives, the exploitation of intangible assets 
and the generation of growth opportunities on leverage and economic value creation 
in FFs. One explanation for this effect is that it is basically due to major barriers (high 
opportunity costs) preventing large-block family shareholders from withdrawing capital 
and investing it elsewhere.
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In conclusion, economic value creation, debt financing and international diversifica-
tion in FFs do not depend simply on ownership concentration and firm size, since the 
evidence also shows that the exploitation of intangible assets, the generation of growth 
opportunities, the DFLL (especially in the firm maturity stage) and family activism are 
the keys to enable FFs to face their current challenges.
6. Limitations and directions for future research
Despite the conclusiveness of our findings, this study has some limitations that will 
need to be taken into account in future research. One is that the sample for this study 
consisted exclusively of family firms in Spain, a country whose financial system is 
mainly bank-oriented. Extension of the sample to include FFs from countries such as 
the UK, Canada or the USA, whose financial systems are oriented towards the stock 
market would lead to more widely applicable results.
One direction for future research would be to examine variability of FF behavior in rela-
tion to value creation at different levels of family activism in bank-oriented economies 
(less protection for minority shareholders) versus market-oriented economies (greater 
protection for minority shareholders). It would also be interesting to analyze the joint 
impact of the generation running the business and stage reached in the firm’s lifecycle 
on economic value creation in FFs.
Our family activism index was constructed taking into account only ownership concen-
tration and the generation running the business (GFF). The incorporation of a variable to 
capture whether or not the owner-manager is also the major shareholder would increase 
the generalizability and measuring validity of this scale.
Similarly, it would be useful to distinguish between leveraged ownership (employee-
owners; service-provider-owners) and non-leveraged ownership (shareholder only) with 
a view to comparing the different aims of each type of owner.
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APPENDIX A. Definition of variables
Variable Definition of variables measures based on prior studies
Leverage
(LEV)




Ratio of profits before interest and tax to total assets.
Boston Consulting Group (1994, 1995), Martin and Petty 
(2001), Martin et al. (2003), Zellweger (2007)
Ownership concentration
(C5)
Summed percentage of shares controlled by top five shareholders
Randoy and Dibrell (2004)
Firm size
(NLSALES) 
Neperian log of total sales volume




Increase in sales between t and t – 1 divided by total sales 
volume at t – 1




Ratio of intangible assets to total assets
Gosselin (1997), Lacuesta et al. (2009)
Lifecycle duration 
(DLFF)
Neperian log of age
Driffield et al. (2004)
Sector of activity
(INDUSTRY)
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm  
belongs to sector J
Driffield et al. (2004)
Economic potential
(EP)
Increase in volume of fixed assets between t and t – 1 plus 
depreciation costs of fixed assets divided by the volume  
of fixed assets at t – 1
Lacuesta et al. (2009)
Investment opportunities
(IO)




Capacity and frequency of shareholder control and monitoring 
over managers in FF
Scope internationalization
(Is)
Number of countries which the firm is exporting 
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